Strategic Communication with China:
What message about space?1

Joan Johnson-Freese

The importance of strategic communication has been stated and restated as part of the “winning the hearts and minds” public diplomacy strategy of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The importance, however, extends beyond the GWOT. Fresh emphasis on strategic communication recognizes the critical nature of properly conveying what America stands for, its values, what it considers important, and its policies and goals in all areas. How, and how well, that is done influences not only how other people and countries view the United States, but how they will react to the United States. While actions may speak louder than words; both words and actions clearly matter.

The overall issue of strategic communication with China is beyond the scope of this article. However, consideration of U.S. strategic communication regarding space activities offers insight into the issues being faced in one important area. In one regard, the message of the United States to China has been crystal clear -- the United States is not interested in cooperative space programs with China. Period. More broadly, however, it is less clear what message the United States is trying to send regarding space. Perhaps, that the United States owns space, so other countries should not try to step into that venue? Space is vital to U.S. national interests, so it is critical to protect U.S. space assets. But does that leave room for other countries in space as well? Space assets are often information assets critical for linkage into an increasingly globalized world. Do some countries, but not others, have the right to use space for both civil and military purposes, as the United States does?

If one believes that big problems are best tackled in small bites, ‘space’ perhaps offers an area where the United States can begin to understand and tackle some of the strategic communication issues it faces.

The Importance Of Strategic Communication

The 2004 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications, states: “This task force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter.” President George W. Bush’s close friend and advisor Karen Hughes was sworn in as the State Department’s undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs, and ambassador for the same, in September 2005 to take on the task of transforming the image of the United States. Recent opinion polls around the world show that she has her work cut out for her. A Pew Research Center Poll taken in April and May 2005, for example, showed China, a communist dictatorship, was viewed more favorably than the United States in 11 of the 16 countries surveyed, including Britain, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan and Indonesia. India and Poland saw the United States in a more favorable light than China, and Canada was about evenly split.2 As the world’s greatest example of democratic success and the “shining city on the hill” for others to model, the United States is clearly having trouble conveying its message. While to a degree it may be ‘normal’ for other countries to view the only remaining superpower with angst if not outright hostility -- and there are times when if they do not love us, some countries need fear us -- these poll numbers seem to indicate negative feelings toward the United States beyond what is normal, and certainly beyond levels desirable.

Strategic relations between China and the United States have many facets and levels. Strategic communication on those different facets and levels may involve a variety of engagements and dialogues with a view toward enhancing mutual understanding. Strategic communications on space, therefore, must be considered within the broader context of U.S.-China relations generally.

Regarding China-U.S. relations, in June 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated “The U.S. welcomes the rise of a confident, peaceful, prosperous China and wants China as a global partner.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick extended Rice’s message in September 2005, talking about how China could become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. But that message has not always been consistent. In fact, there has also been a recent resurgence in what many analysts, particularly outside the United States, see as U.S. China-bashing,3 based on concerns from moralistic neo-conservatives; economic protectionists; defense types concerned about China’s arms build-up -- and needing a worthy peer-competitor to justify the U.S. defense budget; and fundamentalist Christians irate over atheist China’s repressive ways. The concerns of these groups usually surface at lower levels, in functional areas. Subsequently, at the highest level, the United States has attempted to convey to Chinese elites a willingness to work with them. Yet, translating that general willingness to work together into meaningful dialogue in functional areas has been problematic; though at all levels the United States tends to want to delve into specifics uncomfortable for Beijing. In U.S.-China Defense Consultation Talks and military maritime security, for example, the United States seeks transparency on specific capabilities, deployment and spending that China inherently avoids. China, on the other hand, is more interested in engaging in function area dialogue to better understand U.S. strategic intent on issues such as U.S. support for Taiwan, the U.S.-Japan military alliance, the North Korean nuclear issue, and space. Consequently even when dialogue infrequently occurs, both sides can end up frustrated by lack of progress on their goals. Clearly, there is a great deal of work to be done.

The 2004 Defense Science Board report suggests that, “strategic communication describes a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to understand global attitudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through communications strategies.”4 A look at each of these components of strategic communication as they relate to U.S.-China space relations clearly illustrates the many issues that must be addressed.

Space Messages

Understand global attitudes and cultures. Part of the difficulty with assessing China is that it is largely a country opaque to outsiders, and deliberately so. Cultural proclivities toward opaqueness, related to Asian concerns about ‘saving face’ and public pride, predate a military ‘abhorrence’5 of transparency traced back to Sun Tzu. These cultural proclivities are exacerbated by China’s closed political system, and even further intensified in space-related areas by often excessive security concerns common to authoritarian states.6 But in the end, it is the inherently dual-use nature of space technology itself that multiplies the already difficult aspects of analyzing Chinese intentions in space. A submarine has few uses outside the military sector. The same is not true regarding a satellite. An estimated 95 percent of space technology has both civil and military applications and hence is considered ‘dual-use,’ increasing the complexities of determining ‘intent’ exponentially. Additionally, military space technology suitable for defensive purposes often is also suitable for offensive purposes. Cultural proclivities, dual-use technology and a multitude of peripheral issues make determining the intended use of Chinese space technology a 10,000 piece puzzle.

Especially without dialogue, deciphering Chinese intent regarding space becomes considerably more difficult than surveying known capabilities. Analysis must be based on information from a variety of official and unofficial sources, with interpretations falling along a spectrum. Underestimating capabilities and best-case intent evaluations risks being unprepared to deal with the threats posed; overestimating capabilities and worst-case intent evaluations can lead to actions which produce unintended negative consequences that ultimately can increase

wider range of “tolerable” opinions are appearing within academia and in the media. There are now both “official” publications, which are vetted by the gov-wider range of ‘tolerable’ opinions are appearing within academia and in the media. There are now both ‘official’ publications, which are vetted by the government, and commercial, unvetted, publications. Media outlets are proliferating, driven by market competition. Whereas, however, Americans understand the risks of relying on The National Enquirer or a lone blogger for ‘fact,’ the need for similar discrimination among open Chinese sources does not always seem to be understood by U.S. analysts.

For example, perhaps one of the most often-cited Chinese quotes on ‘ntent’ is that of Chinese analyst Wang Hucheng. “For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the methods of tanks and planes, attacking an American space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.” The quote is one of braggadocio -- attempting to make the point that the United States can be beat -- pulled from an article entitled “The U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’ and Strategic Weaknesses,” originally printed in Liaowang, a decidedly anti-American publication and one that certainly represents the anti-U.S. perspective. But there is also an element of asymmetric truth being stated, much like the response from India’s then-chief of staff when asked by reporters what he had learned from observing the conflict in Iraq during the Gulf War. “Don’t fight the Americans without nuclear weapons,” he replied. Neither quote, however, is particularly useful for defense planning purposes.

Similarly, while a treatise on defense policy from a university professor or a War College student being encouraged to ‘think outside the box’ is understood by Americans as not necessarily reflective of U.S. government policy, the same appears not always true about Chinese writers. Another Chinese source widely heralded by U.S. conservatives as indicative of policy is Unrestricted Warfare, written in 1999 by two colonels at a Chinese military institution. While interesting as revealing a line of thought, it does not necessarily ‘reveal’11 Chinese intent.

The increasing information available from China from numerous sources increases the potential for communication misfires. That being the case, careful source checking by analysts is imperative.

Both the fiscal year 2003 (FY 03) and FY 04 Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China contained references to Chinese “parasite” satellites for potential use as ASATs. In the FY 04 report, it was further stated that the claim was still being investigated. That turned out not really to be the case, at least by the U.S. government. According to Union of Concerned Scientist researchers Gregory Kulacki and David Wright, however, a relatively easy Internet search in China places the origin of the story about those satellites with a self-proclaimed “military enthusiast” named Hong Chaofei from a small town in Anhui. Multiple iterations and citations of his story have resulted since it first appeared on the Internet in October 2000. Hong’s website also contains scores of stories on ‘secret’ Chinese weapons to defeat America in a war over Taiwan. China is working on small satellites, but the parasite satellite appears more one-man’s fiction than fact.

There are other instances of misinterpretation as well. Challenges to Space Superiority, published by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in March 2005, highlighted quotes suggesting that China will “threaten on-orbit assets” by Liying Zhan of the Langfang Army Missile Academy. Kulacki and Wright again tracked down the quotes and the source, and again found several key errors; fully documented in a published Union of Concerned Scientists research paper on Chinese military space capabilities.12 Key words were omitted from the actual Chinese quote and there were misinterpretations of what was included. For example, “should” (indicating a recommendation about a decision not yet made) was misinterpreted as “will,” (indicating what China intends to do or is doing). Further, the author was found to be a junior faculty member at a facility primarily responsible for live-fire and simulated training for junior artillery officers, where ASAT research was likely not even going on, and which subsequently has been shut down. Not exactly an authoritative source for U.S. government planning purposes.

China is working on a wide variety of dual-use research potentially applicable to ASAT development, including micro-satellites and small satellites. Some of this research is cited in the 2005 DOD Annual Report to Congress on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, though not always accurately. The medium-resolution Earth observation Tsinghua series being built with Surrey Satellite Technology Limited of the United Kingdom is included, although the resolution for Tsinghua-1 is stated as 40 meters, when it is actually 30 meters -- information easily found on the Internet. Its follow-on, the Naxing-1, is not mentioned in the report, and is in many ways more interesting as a totally Chinese effort with some sophisticated upgrades. In fact, it is currently the smallest satellite with three axis stabilization. Its purpose is stated as “high tech experiments.” Chinese commitment to commercial smallsat development, for applications including mapping and environmental monitoring, is further evidenced by the December 2004 opening of a Microsat Industrial Park in Beijing, a commercial venture with over 16,000 square meters of floor space. That venture is not mentioned in the DOD report either.

Until a few years ago, and the advent of the so-called Blue Team, reports on Chinese space activities were scarce, but for the most part scrupulously documented.13 The Blue Team began in the late 1990s as a small group of congressional staffers, think-tank analysts and academics who vocally and voraciously viewed China as the next enemy. Many of its members have gone from being Washington outsiders during the Clinton years to being insiders with the Bush administration and within the halls of Congress. While ideology prominent in guiding policy decisions during the Bush administration’s first term have largely given way to realism in the second term, no such shift has occurred within select but powerful congressional offices. Beliefs about China’s true aims and goals are strongly held on all sides of this debate in the United States, and the apparent willingness among some U.S. analysts to indiscriminately accept any source written in Chinese means that sooner or later all sides can claim evidence to support their views. This does little to further a useful understanding of China’s intentions.

Why is it important that U.S. reports regarding China’s space program, capabilities and intentions be scrupulously researched and documented? First, analysis researched in support of a preordained conclusion is not analysis and is not useful to defense planners. In fact, it can lead to dangerous miscalculations. Second, if a report is 98 percent valid and 2 percent based on erroneous interpretations or questionable sources, the credibility of the entire report is open to question. Credibility is critical in communications.

Engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions. If the United States is seeking to use strategic communication as a way to influence decision-makers and/or general populations -- with influence defined as the ability to shape or affect others’ beliefs and actions -- then engagement appears necessary, though not necessarily sufficient. Consistently, however, engagement with China on space activities has been summarily rejected by the United States for a variety of reasons, with rejection implemented through both policy and legal channels.

Communication between Chinese and U.S. government agencies is limited and formal. NASA and the China National Space Agency (CNSA) interactions are rare: invitations from NASA to CNSA are seldom offered or visas are often denied14 if events are open to the public. Official U.S. participation in Chinese-sponsored space workshops or events is a non-starter, so as not to signal intentions the United States is not prepared to follow-up on.

There have been two U.S.-China meetings on space of note. In November 2004, a Chinese delegation was invited to attend a three-day workshop in Houston on Bush’s Moon-Mars initiative. As Chinese attendance at these kinds of events requires the blessing of the State Department, this was considered somewhat of a breakthrough from the past. Additionally, former NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe welcomed CNSA Administrator Sun Laiyan to NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., for a courtesy visit translated as ‘no business was discussed’ -- on Thursday, Dec. 2, 2004. Two discussions, however, does not equate with dialogue.

Interaction between the United States and China on military space issues is even rarer. While Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the first U.S. delegation to the Chinese space center outside of Beijing in 2004, the Chinese facilities tour was restricted at best. That tour did little to counter U.S. frustration about the opaqueness of the co-mingled Chinese civil and military space programs, and even added impetus to the arguments of those who reject engagement.

There are several reasons for the U.S. attitude toward China regarding space cooperation. They include: the term ‘engagement’ itself being rejected by some conservative politicians as associated with President Bill Clinton’s China policy; efforts by some to link space cooperation with issues like human rights or nonproliferation; refusal by some to work with a Communist country; concerns about transferring dual-use technology; and worries that China’s lack of reciprocity makes it a one-sided deal favoring China.

But trying to isolate China, however ideologically satisfying that might be, has proven impossible. While it may be convenient to assume that Chinese space technology has been acquired through ‘beg, borrow and steal’ methods, more accurately, the Chinese have developed space capabilities by a combination of ‘borrowing’ generic designs from others, cooperative programs, indigenously developing technology, and buying what they needed and could afford from that which others would sell them.

In a globalized world with a globalized economy, actions on the part of the United States to try to isolate China (or any other actor) into activity or non-activity by denying it something else can only be effective if the United States has full control of whatever it is denying -- and there are few remaining areas where the United States holds a monopoly. In fact, space is one of the most globalized aspects of world commerce. Even with the U.S. military’s ‘dominance’ of military space power, it is highly unlikely that the United States will ever be able to monopolize the space arena.

For example, among the countries that China has worked on space efforts are: European countries collectively and individually; Canada; Russia; and Brazil, on the China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite, touted as the largest space venture by two developing countries and potentially indicative of China posturing toward ‘leading’ other developing countries into space. China’s 2005 satellite sale to Nigeria, and its work with the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization -- an international governmental organization headquartered in Beijing that aims to promote regional multilateral cooperation in space technology and its application -- provide further evidence of China’s desire to cooperate on space activities. So, although U.S. engagement with China on space issues has been strictly limited, China has nevertheless advanced technologically and formed significant strategic space partnerships.

Since the supposedly bipartisan, but in fact politically charged, Cox Commission report in 1999 dealing with espionage at national laboratories and technology theft in conjunction with commercial satellite launches in China, the United States has restricted the transfer of satellite technology to China -- to the detriment of the U.S. aerospace industry on which the U.S military is increasingly reliant.15 Ostensibly, the restrictions were intended to hinder development of Chinese military space capabilities. The breadth and development of Chinese military space capabilities, however, suggest that the U.S. policy has been ineffective. U.S. restrictions apply to commercial communications satellites and their launch, largely unrelated to the sensor technology China particularly needs for development of its military space program. Additionally, restrictive U.S. policy has pushed European companies toward cooperation with China and away from working with the United States.

It might be argued that the Chinese would be even further ahead if the United States had not closed the door on the Chinese market. The fact of the matter is, however, that although the technology China has acquired elsewhere may not be as good as that available from the United States, it’s good enough. And if U.S. restrictions slowed Chinese advancement, it has also perhaps made China more determined to develop its own capabilities rather than being dependent on others. U.S. technology restrictions certainly prodded European satellite companies into moving from being niche component providers to U.S. prime contractors to becoming prime contractors themselves.

Further, the United States has foregone whatever opportunities it might have had to ‘shape’ Chinese space goals in accordance with U.S. interests, though it has successfully done so with other countries. For example, until the United States balked at launching two experimental European communication satellites in the late 1960s, cooperative opportunities with the United States kept France from being able to gather the support requisite to build a European launch vehicle to challenge the U.S. commercial monopoly. More recently, merging the U.S. and Russian manned space programs toward cooperation on the International Space Station was largely motivated by the desire to keep Russian rocket/missile scientists employed and off the international job market. After the recent Shenzhou VI manned launch, editorials in China -- especially the rural areas -- questioned government expenditures on space that could go into domestic programs.16 Clearly too, money being spent on manned space reduces that which can spent on military space.

China is not a partner on the International Space Station (ISS), though it has wanted to be for some time. Initially, the United States rejected Chinese overtures because China lacked either money or technology that partners were required to contribute. When Chinese technology matured to the point where it could have made a useful contribution, and technically-less-advanced Brazil was brought into the partnership but still China was spurned, it became clear to all that politics was really the basis for Chinese exclusion. Conservative U.S. politicians did not want to include the largest remaining Communist country in the world in a program largely motivated by a desire to show that countries could peacefully work together. Media comments from Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., in 2001, regarding discussions about increasing international financial contributions to the space station in 2001, are illustrative. While acknowledging that China might have the resources to contribute to the station, Rohrabacher said he has ruled out approaching Beijing due to that country’s human rights abuses. Specifically he stated, “The space station’s supposed to stand for something better.”17 The question that must be asked, however, is whether the benefits of exclusion outweigh the costs already cited.

At a July 27, 2005, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, two views on the benefits and dangers of contact with the Chinese (particularly the military) were expressed, fairly typical of those prevailing. Franklin Kramer, former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, spoke in favor of contact.
As Kramer states, engaging with the Chinese allows information to be gathered from a still largely-closed society. Further, creating a Chinese dependence on U.S. technology offers the United States more leverage than pushing Beijing closer to others. Including China in cooperative manned programs also utilizes Chinese funds that might otherwise go into military programs, makes the tortoise and the hare space race plaguing the United States vanish, and emphasizes U.S. leadership in a positive manner.

Richard D. Fisher, vice-president, International Assessment and Strategy Center, expressed a different view.

The suggested technology transfer that might occur were a Chinese taikonaut to participate on a shuttle mission is stunning. When the United States was trying to share technology with other developed countries in the formative years of COMSAT, it was found to be very difficult, even when blueprints and manuals were shared. Further, while there appears concern that the Chinese will develop a significant manned military capability, history shows that both the Americans and Soviets tried to find an advantage to a manned military presence, and couldn’t. The Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was a program planned by the U.S. Air Force to house military astronauts, and it was cancelled. Sensors have much better eyesight than astronauts. Is there a fear that Chinese ingenuity will be able to find value in a military-man-in-space that eluded the U.S. military? There seems little basis for such a fear.

While U.S. dialogue with China is spotty, as noted above, China has been proactive in dialoguing with other countries, sometimes effectively making points at the expense of the United States. In the multilateral arena, China, with Russia, has been a strong and vocal advocate for a treaty banning space weapons -- a pursuit for which it has been successful in gaining support at the United Nations. In 2000, the U.N. General Assembly voted on a resolution called the “Prevention of Outer Space Arms Race.” It was adopted by a vote of 163 in favor to none against, with three abstentions: the Federated States of Micronesia, Israel and the United States.18 On Dec. 8, 2003, 174 nations voted ‘yes’ on a United Nations resolution calling for negotiations toward preventing an arms race in space.19 Only four countries abstained: the United States, Israel, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.

The United States has not been interested in space arms control in general, feeling it is not in its best interests. China has taken advantage of that stance. Further, China’s choice of venue for its issues with space weapons -- the U.N. General Assembly or the Conference on Disarmament -- offers China considerable negotiating leverage with a low-risk of being held to task for potential follow-through. Bilateral negotiations would be much more difficult and higher risk for both sides. While the U.N. venue offers China positive public relations exposure with low-risk of constraining its activities, there may also be another reason for avoiding more difficult bilateral talks.

China lacks experience in strategic arms control negotiations and verification follow-up. The Union of Concerned Scientists have been conducting annual workshops for the past several years toward training Chinese researchers to being more adept at such negotiations, in the hopes that their expertise will be put to use sometime soon. Bush’s appointment of ‘neo-conservative super-hawk’20 Robert G. Joseph to replace John Bolton as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs does not bode well in that regard. Joseph has been a leading advocate of countering Chinese advances not with dialogue or arms control, but with the unilateral U.S. deployment of high-tech active, as well as passive, weapons systems. It isn’t China that comes across internationally as wanting to turn the Heavens into a shooting gallery.

Advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices.21 With an authoritarian government in place, Chinese public opinion is not a force comparable to that in the United States, but it is increasingly becoming a force with which the Chinese leadership must contend. A full spectrum of attitudes toward the United States can be found, as evidenced in the June 2005 Pew study.22 Clearly, however, the Chinese are influenced by single events. Chinese citizens reacted virulently, for example, to both the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and the death of the Chinese pilot in the EP-3 incident over Hainan Island in 2001. If the Chinese are negatively impacted by events, perhaps they can be positively impacted too.

The current U.S. approach to strategic communication seems to understate the importance of positive ‘singular opportunities’ and images, though the increase in favorable opinion toward the United States after its 2004 tsunami relief efforts clearly demonstrated that opportunities exist. A single bold act, such as allowing a Chinese taikonaut on a shuttle flight, could create a powerful, positive effect on Chinese public opinion. Such a shuttle flight would generate tangible images and news coverage much the same as Apollo-Soyuz did in 1975. If one’s goal with strategic communication is, in part, to alter Chinese public opinion, these images could be very potent.

Currently, Chinese policy-makers are being more affected by U.S. policy than the Chinese public. While the U.S. commitment to manned space may be tenuous, its commitment to utilization of space and space technology as key military assets is not. Although the Gulf War was dubbed ‘the first Space War,’ it was actually a first step into much larger reliance and utilization of military space (milspace) assets in areas such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs, or smart bombs), culminating most recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).23 For example, from Operation Desert Storm in 1991, to Operation Allied Force in Serbia in 1992, to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002 in Afghanistan, PGMs as a percentage of total delivered air weapons went from 7.7 percent to 29.8 percent to 60.4 percent.24 Increased dependence on space assets leads to an increased need to protect those assets and U.S. efforts in that regard are carefully followed in Beijing. Chinese officials are particularly wondering whether or not efforts are being limited to the defensive realm.

With the issuance of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, in August 2004, U.S. intentions regarding protecting U.S. space assets and denying the use of space to potential adversaries was more clearly articulated in an unclassified document than ever before. Intentions include the development and use of offensive counterspace capabilities. Counterspace operations are those intended to defend U.S. space assets and capabilities, but also to deny enemies the same. “Offensive counterspace” basically means the ability to attack in defense of your own assets or the denial of assets to others. Statements regarding potential space weapon development in the past had always referenced a purely defensive mission. But this doctrinal shift potentially puts satellites of all types, including commercial and those from neutral countries, potentially at risk. The document also indicates a clear belief on the part of the Air Force leadership who wrote and approved the document that space warfare has the support of the civilian leadership. That, coupled with preemption principles embedded in the 2002 National Security Strategy, has generated considerable alarm in some countries, perhaps China most of all.

Beyond paper documents, actions can be interpreted as indicators of U.S. intentions in space as well. For example, a new ground-based system capable of attacking enemy satellite communications, the so-called Counter Communications System, was announced at an aerospace conference in September 2004 by Air Force Brig. Gen. Larry James, vice commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles.25 Also, small satellite technology that the United States has grave concerns about China developing is being vigorously pursued in the United States. In fact, an Air Force official, speaking to a reporter from the trade publication Inside the Pentagon about an Air Force smallsat program known as XSS, stated, “XSS-11 can be used as an ASAT weapon.”26 What message should be read into that statement?

While the Counterspace Operations doctrine document says the United States seeks “space superiority,” an advantage over other countries by some potentially minimum amount, “space dominance,” the unchallengeable ability to control the space environment, appears the ultimate U.S. goal. The lineage of this position comes from documents such as Vision for 2020, published in 1997 by U.S. Space Command, which stated, “The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance.” The themes of that document were later echoed in the 2000 Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management Organization. Known as the Space Commission and chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, just prior to his assuming the position as U.S. defense secretary, that congressionally chartered commission warned in its final report submitted to Congress on Jan. 11, 2001, that: “If the United States is to avoid a ‘Space Pearl Harbor,’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems.” The commission recommended the creation of a U.S. Space Corps that would defend space-based “military capability.” In 2003, the Air Force released a Transformation Flight Plan,27 including plans for orbiting weapons that would send giant metal rods crashing to Earth, officially called Hypervelocity Rod Bundles, though dubbed ‘Rods from God.’ That document, however, only talked about hardware. The 2004 Counterspace Operations doctrine document adds another component part to the trend of developing space as the fourth battlespace: the component that states when and how such hardware would be used.

U.S. rhetoric and activities have not gone unnoticed in other countries, including China. When the U.S. government begins publishing documents on web pages showing lasers firing from space, as the Vision 2020 website originally did, people and countries tend to get nervous. The ‘Rods from God’ concept, with an artist’s rendering provided in the June 2004 issue of Popular Science, has generated considerable discussion at scientific conferences, not only about technical viability, but whom the United States intends to use it against.

In July 2004, the British press first began reporting fears that the United States was developing killer satellites capable of destroying European Galileo navigation satellites if it felt that potential adversaries could use them against the United States.28 The following October another round of media reports surfaced, mostly in Europe, that the United States had threatened to blow Galileo out of the sky during a meeting at Whitehall on the topic of Europe’s challenge to the U.S. Global Positioning System.29 While it turned out that reporters totally exaggerated the issue, the incident is illustrative of the mistrust of the United States in space.

In 1997, when the United States still strongly embraced multilateralism, countries reassured each other and accepted reassurance from Washington that U.S. intent was benign and defensive. Today, with the United States seen as not just embracing, but boasting, a primacist grand strategy, employing preemptive tactics, and talking in terms of ‘preventive war’ as the future norm, accepting that reassurance has become increasingly difficult for allies and potential competitors alike. Whereas Chinese references to Shashoujian, the Assassin’s Mace or silver bullet approach, draws concern about China’s intentions in the United States, similar concerns are raised internationally by the U.S. focus on preemption, preventive war and unilateralism.

Regarding the Chinese manned space program, immediately following the October 2003 first launch of a taikonaut, the official U.S. response to China joining the exclusive club of manned spaceflight capable countries was coolly congratulatory. While other countries and world leaders praised the Chinese accomplishment -- albeit in the case of countries like Japan and India, somewhat grudgingly and not without some jealousy -- the U.S. reticence toward congratulating a Communist country for a technological achievement was obvious. Subsequent to the launch, the program has drawn some fire in the United States.

The Chinese flew sophisticated military equipment on the ShenzhouV capsule. Conservative analysts in the United States translated that to equating the program being a Trojan horse for military space activities.

Either these analysts forget, however, or don’t care, that the size of the Space Shuttle cargo bay was specifically dictated by the U.S. military in order for it to carry intelligence payloads, or that the Pentagon nearly stopped the ISS in its tracks with its demand to retain the right to conduct research there. Few U.S. analysts would suggest, however, that either the shuttle or the ISS is a cover for military space activities. Consequently, the tone of the concerns about the Chinese activities comes across as more than a little hypocritical.

Whether the promulgation of documents and activities interpreted as potentially threatening has gone generally unnoticed by the mainstream U.S. media and the public -- and subsequently policy-makers -- or, alternatively, that there is “near-hysterical ranting” by those against weaponization, who invoke charges of fear mongering and “whipping up anxieties with little rational justification”31 -- depends on perspective. A third perspective states that talk about space weaponization is merely “bold rhetoric” on the part of military officials that should not be taken seriously.32 Unfortunately, the Chinese and others are unsure when the United States should be taken seriously and when it should not. After all, the United States has made errors itself, perhaps most notably when Washington dismissed glasnost and perestroika as Soviet window dressing. Perhaps not coincidentally, space in many ways remains one of the last venues of Cold War thinking, with assets considered so important that zero-sum thinking prevails.

There is some evidence that policy-makers now are considering public opinion in U.S. space policy. The new National Space Policy that has been due out ‘any day’ for months will likely not include language as explicitly supportive of space weapons than it might have had weaponization not garnered media attention briefly in May 2005.33 It is far more likely, however, that it was U.S. public opinion seen as potentially reacting negatively to an overt weaponization policy, and hence influencing policy, than international public opinion. But international public opinion influences reactions in and from other countries with which the United States must then contend.

Influence attitudes and behavior through communications strategies. Militarily, the world understands that it is futile to take on the United States force-on-force. That makes asymmetrical responses both logical and attractive. While it does not currently appear to be the case, China could seek an asymmetrical advantage in space as well, since parity is technically and economically out of the question for some time, and perhaps not even needed to be a space power.34 Currently, however, Beijing does not have a coherent military space architecture, but rather it appears to be actively pursuing a wide-range of capabilities. China watched the United States establish space dominance in the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It realized how far behind it was. “We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us,” said Maj. Gen. Franklin Blaisdell, director of space operations for the Air Force, eight days before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.35 Nevertheless -- or perhaps at least partly pushed by that pronouncement -- China clearly feels compelled to develop military space capabilities.

Two critical events occurred in 2001 that the Chinese interpreted as sending clear messages to them. First, as noted earlier, the United States issued the Space Commission report. The part of the report that caught the attention of the Chinese was the statement that space would inevitably become a battleground, therefore the United States would be remiss not to prepare,36 with the unspoken assumption being that preparation meant the development of space weapons. Second, the United States held its first-ever space war game, called Schriever I.37 In that well-publicized war game, U.S. forces were pitted against an opponent threatening a small island neighbor, one about the size and location of Taiwan. It didn’t take the Chinese long to conclude that they in turn would be remiss not to prepare for the inevitability of U.S. development of space weapons, as China might well be the target of those weapons. From the Chinese perspective, officials have concluded that if the United States would be remiss to not prepare for the inevitable weaponization of space and against a space Pearl Harbor, they would be remiss not to prepare for the execution of the U.S. Counterspace Operations doctrine as part of a unilaterally developed and supported preemptive action. Is that the response that the United States has been seeking?

Both China and the United States see space assets as so valuable to their national security equations that any gain made by one country in advancing its capabilities is viewed as not just threatening but as a loss by the other. China is interested in developing military space capabilities as part of its military modernization effort, as are most countries in the world. It is further interested in development of space capabilities as part of globalization efforts and to send a techno-nationalist message regionally and globally. But China is also responding to the message it hears from the United States.

Rather than the Space Pearl Harbor analogy, perhaps another analogy should be considered instead: Space 1914. While far from a perfect analogy, the image of two countries becoming locked into a particular understanding of a strategic environment and unnecessarily setting themselves on a course for future crises with considerable escalatory potential does fit. The resultant conflict could have been wholly avoidable, had the participants a better understanding of the true situation. Strategic communication should make that better understanding possible.

Intended Message/Received Message

The United States says it is interested in working with China “as a global partner.” Yet actions don’t match words when in functional areas such as space, it maintains a strategy that the United States might characterize as hedging, but many see as containment,38 trying to ignore the Chinese regarding cooperation in space while the other nations of the world are falling all over themselves to engage China. China, on the other hand, is making it clear it is open to cooperation. In fact, at the first International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) conference, held in Nice, France, in October 2005, an official from the government-run China Aerospace & Science Corporation (CASC) offered an open invitation to international cooperation on Chinese programs during a presentation. So, while engaging in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions is one of the four fundamental premises of strategic communication, the United States has summarily rejected that premise regarding China and space. The message from the United States is clear in that regard. Whether it is the right message, however, is increasingly doubtful.

In other areas, regarding U.S. intentions in space and the U.S. view of Chinese space activities, the message is less clear. The United States seems to be almost schizophrenic in denying any intentions regarding space weapons on one hand and having Air Force officials boast of their accomplishments and gee-whiz programs in that area, based on no apparent requirement, on the other. Further, holding and widely publicizing a space war game with China as the obvious ‘enemy’ could be interpreted as indicating U.S. plans. Was that the intent?

Moreover, the United States makes arguments that come across as hypocritical. When the United States pursues certain technologies, remote sensing and communications, for example, it is for connectivity in a global world. When China pursues similar technology, nefarious intent is assumed because of its Communist government. In the area of smallsat and microsat technology, the pursuance of programs like the XSS is presented in the United States as defensive, while China’s small satellite program is viewed as an obvious step to developing an offensive ASAT capability. Even Chinese manned space activities are viewed by conservative analysts in the United States as inherently for military gain, though the United States was unable to capitalize on a manned program for military gain except indirectly and NASA has not been immune to the Pentagon imposing itself on its programs.

Finally, the United States has made it clear that it is not interested in space arms control -- while China and Russia have led the world in obtaining a majority vote at the United Nations -- where the United States once again comes across as holding a position diametrically opposed to world opinion, and once again appears to focus on military answers to all questions of international relations. Consequently, it seems that China may currently hold a global advantage over the United States regarding strategic communications on space. Although U.S. policy-makers may presume that as a democracy, U.S. intentions are inherently viewed as benign, opinion polls show this is a false presumption. While the United States may see itself as Han Solo or Obi-Wan Kenobi, much of the rest of the world, including China, hears the eerie voice of Darth Vader when the United States speaks of its plans in space.39

Conclusion

Space is an enabler of globalization and of military modernization. China fully intends to be active in both. China is determined not to allow the technology gap between the United States and China to continue to grow unchallenged. The more the United States relies on military technology as the answer to all problems, the more China will look for ways to circumvent those technologies -- and defense is much easier and cheaper than offense. The United States must find ways to prevent other countries, specifically China, from gaining a military advantage in space without making its own assets more vulnerable. It must do so without being put in a position of having to both dominate offensively and defensively, which realistically may be impossible to sustain.

Reviewing U.S. efforts regarding strategic communication with China on space up to the present, it can only be concluded that the United States is failing in all areas. The United States summarily rejects one key premise; does poorly in the other three; and ultimately is less than clear in presenting a message that will likely invoke a positive response from China, or any country. In fact, the basic problem is that it is not even clear what kind of space activity, if any, China could pursue that the United States would consider non-threatening.

Assuming that the strange bedfellows who thwart engagement with China will continue to exert themselves in many functional areas in the near future, including space -- and that is likely the case -- then at the very least the United States must decide what message it wants to send China, and other countries, about space and do so clearly and consistently. That effort in and of itself would be a very useful. Equally important, administration leadership is crucial toward overcoming opposition and treading softly into space cooperation with China in the non-threatening area of space science, to allow both sides a better understanding of cultural and bureaucratic differences, and there will be many, relevant to working together. Ultimately, however, if the United States is serious about improving its strategic communication, there is no substitute for dialogue. Acknowledging that China and the United States seek different outcomes from dialogue, including China in the talks about the Bush Moon-Mars Initiative -- for which there is already precedent -- appears a good place to start, as those talks have been at the strategic level. The intent would be to build the trust necessary to work together on more prickly issues. Some people would likely say that it is impossible to build trust with China, as long as it is Communist. But not trying is not in the best interests of the United States.

The Pentagon’s 2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China describes China as being at a strategic crossroads. The United States clearly will influence what road China takes into the future, generally and regarding space specifically. The good news for the United States is that it appears that China does not yet have a plan for fully integrating space capabilities into is military doctrine or organizations, or for trying to acquire an asymmetrical advantage in space. While Beijing may choose to develop one regardless of U.S. actions, if the United States continues to express a schizophrenic attitude toward both China and space activities, particularly space weapons, almost certainly it will. The United States thus could give China the focus it has been lacking, and push it down a road the United States doesn’t want it to go. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States decide what message it is trying to send about space, and stay on message.



Endnotes
1. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. The author would like to thank Dr. Tom Nichols and Dr. Andrew Stigler, both of the Naval War College; Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information; and Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists, for their comments on earlier drafts. The responsibility for the content and views expressed rest solely with the author.
2. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “U.S. Image up Slightly, But Still Negative,” June 23, 2005; cited in “Poll: In Wake of Iraq War, Allies Prefer China to U.S.,” June 24, 2005. See: http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/06/23/poll.america.ap/.
3. “Giving China a Bloody Nose: China Bashing,” The Economist, Aug. 6, 2005; Bates Gill and Robin Niblett, “Divergent Paths Hurt U.S. and Europe: Dealing with China,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 2005; Sheila McNulty, “Chevron chief regrets taint of xenophobia,” Financial Times (London), Aug. 11, 2005.
4. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004. See: www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ 2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf p. 11.
5. Statement of Richard Fisher, Committee on House Armed Service, July 27, 2005.
6. It should be noted too that part of the problem is clearly political. Communication and information sharing issues are less common with businesses, even U.S. businesses, and among non-U.S. entities. European Union officials, for example, state that even on sensitive issues like nuclear affairs, communication and information sharing are far less an issue than their American counterparts claim they encounter.
7. China is credited with being far more astute at utilizing open-source material than is the United States, to the extent that its abilities are considered a serious security threat and, though not illegal, part of Chinese espionage efforts. See: United Press International, “U.S. grapples with intense Chinese spying,” June 27, 2005.
8. Richard Fisher, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2005.
9. Bill Gertz,“China a ‘Central’ Spying Threat,” The Washington Times, Sept. 29, 2005, 4.
10. 2004 Summer Study, Chapter 5, 173.
11. J. Michael Waller, “PLA Revises the Art of War”, Insight on the News, Feb. 28, 2000.
12 . See http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/china/new-questions-about-us-intelligence on-china.html.
13. See, for example, Mark Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization,” September 1999. See: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/chinamod.htm.
14. The rationale for large-scale visa rejection is that China’s “national-level intelligence services employs a full range of collection methodologies, from targeting of well-placed foreign government officials, senior scientists and businessmen to the exploitation of academic activities, student populations and private businesses.” Michelle Van Cleave, quoted by Bill Gertz, “China a ‘Central’ Spying Threat,” The Washington Times, Sept. 29, 2005, p. 4.
15. Joan Johnson-Freese, “Becoming Chinese: Or, How U.S. Satellite Export Policy Threatens National Security,” Space Times, January/February 2001; Alice in Licenseland: U.S. Satellite Export Controls Since 1990, Space Policy, August 2000.
16. “Space mission generating national pride but also criticism”, AsiaNews.it, Oct.13, 2005.
17. Marc Selinger, “Rep. Rohrabacher sees progress in bid to boost foreign role in ISS,” Aerospace Daily, Aug. 30, 2001, 3.
18. General Assembly Press Release, GA9829, Nov. 20, 2000. See: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001120.ga9829.doc.html.
19. Resolution 58/36.
20. Martin Sieff, “Russia, China join against U.S. Star Wars,” SpaceWar, June 20, 2005. See: http://www.spacewar.com/news/milspace-05zp.html.
21. Part of the material in this section is from: Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions, Columbia University Press, forthcoming 2006.
22. See: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=801.
23. See, for example, “Operation Iraqi Freedom -- By The Numbers,” Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF, USCENTAF, Assessment and Analysis Division, April 30, 2003.
24. Christopher J. Bowle, et al, Future War, Analysis Center Paper, Northrup Grumman, January 2003, p. 46.
25. Ann Imse, “U.S. Deploys Weapon to Attack Satellites,” Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 1, 2004.
26. Elaine M. Grossman and Keith J. Costa, “Small, Experimental Satellite May Offer More Than Meets The Eye”, Inside the Pentagon, Dec. 4, 2003.
27. See: www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf.
28. Christopher Booker, “Global Repositioning: Galileo Threatens ‘Special Relationship’ with U.S.” Sunday Telegraph (London), July 4, 2004.
29. Christopher Booker, “Star Wars: Continents clash in outer space,” Sunday Telegraph (London), Oct. 31, 2004; Allister Heath, “U.S. Threatens to Take Space War to Third Dimension,” The
Business, Oct. 31, 2004; “U.S. Could Shoot Down EU Satellites if Used by Foes in Wartime,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 24, 2004.
30. Richard D. Fisher, Statement before House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2005.
31. James Oberg, “Hyperventilating Over ‘Space Weapons’” USA Today, June 14, 2005, p.11.
32. Dwayne Day, “General Power vs. Chicken Little,” The Space Review, May 23, 2005.
33. Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons,” The New York Times, May 18, 2005.
34. See: James A. Lewis, “China as a Military Space Competitor,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2004, 2-12.
35. Jack Kelly, “US the Leader in War Plans for Space: Gaining the Ultimate Highground,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 28, 2003.
36. The Space Commission report can be accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/spaceabout.html (accessed 11/05/03).
37. See, for example: Thomas E. Ricks, “Space is Playing Field for Newest War Game,” Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2001, 1.
38. See, for example, Henry Kissinger, “China: Containment Won’t Work,” Washington Post, June 13, 2005, 19.
39. From: Joan Johnson-Freese, Chapter 1, Heavenly Ambitions, Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 2006.