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Trends in China¡¯s Space Program
And the Prevention of Outer Space Weaponization
Teng Jianqun
China¡¯s successful launch of the Shenzhou VI manned space vessel on Oct. 12, 2005, once again demonstrated to the world the country¡¯s achievements and strength in outer space. In light of this launch, foreign media sources have made a number of conjectures about the future of China¡¯s space program. Some have even suggested that it will make obsolete the U.S. missile defense program, and that there will be an outer space arms race between China and the United States. Within China, the state media provided comprehensive coverage of the launch, its activities in space and return of the spacecraft. While authorities have strictly controlled commentary on the launch, they maintained that the goals of China¡¯s space program are entirely peaceful, and denied any military application.
In fact, the Shenzhou VI mission had no military component. However, like other technical platforms, the spacecraft itself holds the potential for dual-use applications. Whether China will apply its space technology to weapons is a current issue that has raised many questions. For example, as the military and civilian use of such technology becomes more compatible, is China willing to commit its limited resources towards outer space weaponization? Will China¡¯s progress in space technology contribute to an arms race in outer space and pose a challenge to U.S. superiority? As the international community has become increasingly wary over the weaponization of outer space, it is necessary for China to clarify its position on this issue? The author will examine these issues in the following analysis.
Program Goals and Accomplishments
Weaponization is a policy choice rather than a result of having one or two platforms in place. In contrast to its approach in utilizing nuclear energy technology, China has from the outset charted a definitive course for its space industry: to pursue economic and technological development based on the domestic and international environment.1
China¡¯s space mission began in the mid-1950s though meaningful progress only started in the 1980s. Apart from the Shenzhou series, China has also seen encouraging achievements in the following fields: (1) It has formed a relatively complete program ranging from research and design, to experimentation and manufacturing; (2) It has established a network for measurement and control consisting of launch centers, domestic ground stations and remote tracking and measurement systems capable of launching various satellites and spacecraft; (3) It has established a range of satellite applications; (4) It has built a space research system that meet the highest professional standards; and (5) It has trained a large number of highly qualified space science and technology personnel.
China¡¯s development in space centers around five major components: (1) Satellites. On April 24, 1974, China successfully launched its first man-made Earth observation satellite, Dongfanghong-1. Currently, China¡¯s satellite series is divided into five categories: recoverable remote sensing; communications and broadcasting; weather; scientific exploration and technology experiments; and Earth resources; (2) Launch Vehicles. China¡¯s launch vehicles mainly consist of the Long March series, used to launch satellites into near-Earth, geostationary and solar synchronous orbits; (3) Launch sites. China¡¯s three launch sites in Jiuquan, Xichang and Taiyuan have completed rocket experiments and successfully launched various man-made satellites and spacecraft; (4) Space measurement and control system. This includes establishing land as well as ship-based marine measurement and control networks, a system that has already successfully fulfilled the space measurement and control tasks for near-Earth orbit satellites, geostationary satellites and spacecraft; (5) Manned space missions; (6) A lunar exploration program. The long-term aim of this program is to set up a base on the moon similar to what China accomplished at the North and South Pole.
China¡¯s space applications include: (1) Satellite remote sensing. Since the 1970s, remote sensing has seen extensive use in the fields of meteorology, geology and mining, surveying and mapping, agriculture, forestry, water conservation, oceanography, earthquake research and urban construction. China has established the National Remote Sensing Center, the National Satellite Meteorological Center, the National Resources Satellite Application Center, the Satellite Ocean Application Center and the National Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Receiving Station; (2) Satellite communications. China began developing its satellite communications technology in the mid-1980s. During this period, China has established dozens of medium- and large-sized satellite communication ground stations serving 27,000 international communications satellite phone lines with over 180 countries and regions as well as nearly 100,000 domestic communications phone lines; (3) Satellite navigation and positioning. In the 1980s, China began using foreign navigation satellites to develop satellite navigation and positioning application technologies, which are widely used for geodesy, shipping and flight navigation, earthquake monitoring, geological disaster monitoring, forest fire prevention and urban transport management.
In space sciences, a field that began in the 1980s, China used a recoverable remote sensing satellite to conduct various experiments, making progress in crystal and protein growth, cell culture and crop breeding.
China has set new development goals for its space mission in the 21st Century. These mainly include: (1) Establishing a long-term, stable satellite-to-Earth observation system. The weather, resources and ocean satellite series and the environmental and disaster monitoring small satellites will form a system enabling stereoscopic observation and dynamic monitoring of the land, atmosphere and oceans of China and its surrounding areas; (2) Establishing an independently operated satellite broadcasting and telecommunications system. China is actively supporting the development of commercial broadcasting and telecommunications satellites such as geostationary telecom satellites and TV direct broadcasting satellites with long operating life, high reliability and large capacity, so as to form China¡¯s satellite telecom industry; (3) Establishing an independent satellite navigation and positioning system. This includes incremental construction of a navigational and positioning satellite series and relevant application system; (4) Upgrading the overall standard and capacity of China¡¯s launch vehicles. This will be achieved by improving the performance and reliability of the existing Long March series and developing the next generation of non-toxic, pollution-free, high-performance and low-cost launch vehicles; (5) Preliminarily establishing a manned space engineering research, development and testing system; (6) Establishing a coordinated nationwide satellite remote sensing application system and a unified plan for building various satellite remote sensing and ground application systems.
Domestic and International Environment
Based on the above review of China¡¯s space program ambitions, we can, at the very least, draw the following conclusions. The primary effort is in meeting the challenges in civilian research and development. This contrasts with the early period of China¡¯s nuclear energy development, when the primary focus was on developing nuclear weapons. Under the different international security environment today however, China is striving to develop its economy and build a harmonious and prosperous society, for which space technology applied in the broader civilian sector will be a principal driver. In pursuit of its space aspirations, China is realizing the centuries-old dream of ¡®flying into space¡¯ to show itself as a world power and to bolster national spirit.
The international environment China faces presently has changed profoundly since the 1980s. ¡®Peace and development¡¯ have become the theme of the times. China no longer faces the nuclear threats and blackmail it once did in the 1950s and 1960s. According to statistics from Indian scholars, from its founding in 1949 to the 1980s, China has been threatened with use of nuclear weapons at least 40 times by certain powers, mainly the United States. However, in recent decades, without pressure to use outer space technology for military applications, major space-faring nations including the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) have begun to cooperate extensively in space. Such collaboration, including satellite launches, is the inevitable outcome of easing Cold War tensions.
Over the past 20 years, the development of China¡¯s space program has coincided with the country¡¯s reform and opening-up. In the mid-1980s, with potential threats such as invasion and intervention by foreign military powers decreasing, China shifted its focus to economic development. This led to a fundamental change in China¡¯s military posture. Up to this point, China¡¯s military had been readying itself for imminent war. The state of alertness in ¡°preparing for an early war, a big war, a nuclear war¡±, as advocated by Mao Zedong, was abandoned.2 Consequently, the People¡¯s Liberation Army (PLA) that had for decades been the country¡¯s top priority was downgraded to serving and yielding to the country¡¯s comprehensive economic construction. Thus began the period of development under which the guiding principle for the PLA would be restraint. This was reflected by full-scale disarmament. Between 1985 and 2005, the PLA was reduced in size by 1.7 million. At the same time, China has entered a stage of full economic liberalization and development. Standards of living have risen significantly and China¡¯s comprehensive national strength has noticeably improved. Such a domestic environment suggests that China will not develop its space program in the same way its nuclear program was developed under Mao and the first generation of leaders -- through belt tightening and military application. It is neither realistic nor necessary to commit limited space resources to military purposes.
During this current period of transition, China¡¯s decision-makers are well aware that the economic structure and ideological framework on which the country has operated for decades are cracking. Both the national economy and individual ideology are rapidly transforming. To unite its people, China must initiate activities and programs that boost morale and lift the national spirit. One message is clear from the enthusiastic, though controlled media coverage of the Shenzhou spacecraft series, particularly Shenzhou V and VI: their significance far exceeds the launch of the spacecraft. The successful manned space program is not merely a technological feat, but an embodiment of national spirit. Along with achievements such as winning the bid to host the Olympic Games and accession to the World Trade Organization, the Shenzhou launches are considered by the Chinese people as symbols of the nation¡¯s strength.
Given the current circumstances, it would not be possible for China¡¯s space mission to principally focus on military application. Expanding the military applications of China¡¯s space program would demonstrate total disregard for the current international security environment and China¡¯s focus on economic development. China does not have such intention or plan. Conversely, China will accelerate scientific research in space, which will spearhead its advance in comprehensive national strength to ensure its status as a major power and its place in the international development of outer space.
Evolution of War
The lessons of history show that absent any restrictions, where social and economic productivity develops, military innovation will not be far behind. The military has always been highly sensitive to changes in the level of social productivity. In fact, the expansion of battlefield and the development of new weaponry have been almost in direct sync with economic and technological development. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the development of human productivity will ineluctably bring war from land, sea and air into outer space if no constraints are placed on it.
One of the key reasons for this is the inherently neutral quality of innovation and technology. Virtually, any advancement in human productivity can be used for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. The development of atomic energy is a telling example of the organic dual-use nature of technology. Nuclear reactors have not only provided mankind with a new energy source, but have also led to the production of highly destructive weapons. World powers eventually negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but only after nuclear proliferation became a reality. Like nuclear power, mature space technologies also have an inherent dual-use application. Admitting only to the civilian use of space and not its military function would be to deny reality. Likewise, making the same mistake in controlling the use of space will prove both costly and disastrous.
The advance of modern human productivity and progress in technology have profoundly transformed the battlefield, weaponry and combatants, all of which are interdependent and often mutually reinforcing. The expansion of the battlefield constitutes an intangible developmental force and can give rise to new weapons. New weapons in turn can also enlarge the battlefield or create a new spatial dimension for warfare. Both affect the way in which the combatants operate. The relationship between them is reflected in the fact that the emergence of every new weapon is the result of a need on the battlefield at the time. When a new weapon appears, the space occupied by the old naturally gives way to the new.
When man fought with his bare hands, the battlefield was limited. The advent of gunpowder and firearms created an entirely new reality for warfare, vastly extending the size of the battlefield and virtually eliminating the need for hand-to-hand fighting.
Today, combatants have also radically changed from the uniformed rank and file of soldiers to civilians. During the attack on the United States of Sept. 11, 2001, the terrorists responsible were not soldiers in uniform but common civilians. Their weapons of choice were neither fighter jet planes nor tanks, but civilian passenger planes. Such transformation of the battlefield and those fighting on it is unprecedented. The nature of war is undergoing profound and systematic changes. We must redefine the true meaning of security, war, military buildup and modes of battle. Traditional experience no longer applies.
In utilizing modern weapons soldiers can achieve maximum damage with relatively little effort. One such modern battlefield that has emerged in recent years is cyberspace. In this environment, information war can begin on one side of the world and strike a target on the other. It can destroy banking systems or paralyze the traffic control system of the target country. It has also given rise to ¡®digital troops¡¯ and intangible electromagnetic space and information weapons. While the battlefield may be virtual in nature, its power can nevertheless be equally destructive to dropping an atomic bomb over a city.
As battleships brought war to the seas, and airplanes brought war to the sky, mankind¡¯s efforts to conquer outer space has brought warfare there too. Furthermore, it is in the environment of space where the most drastic transformation of the battlefield and weaponry is taking place. Currently, developed countries have made information and space technology the platform and primary means of competition. The widespread application of military satellites, space vehicles and other armaments has appropriated the tranquility of space. Though people have not yet fully envisioned all the new weapons that can be brought about by the integration of information and space technology, we have nevertheless seen the beginning of such trends.
In 2000, Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, commander of the U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command, noted that outer space is increasingly indispensable to ground, sea and air combat. Thus, the United States must focus its attention on space dominance. On Jan. 11, 2001, the U.S. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) recognized the need to prevent a ¡°space Pearl Harbor¡± against the United States. It noted that like land, sea and air, the ¡°mission¡± of outer space will, without exception, become a venue for military competition and the United States should make early preparations for this eventuality. In fact, when the United States began its pursuit of space technology over a half century ago, American leaders, including John F. Kennedy, had already begun to understand the military significance of outer space. They realized that whoever controlled outer space would also control the Earth.
Today, the advancement of social productivity and technology brings man into outer space, and along with it, military influence will spread to every facet of space development. If the international community allows this trend to continue, the weaponization of outer space will become a reality. However, the international community has learned its lessons from previous arms races, and understands that it is not only imperative but also feasible to prevent one in outer space. With the advances of technology, increasing economic globalization and growing human aspirations for peace, controlling space weaponization is an urgent task for the greater international community.
The Time to Act is Now
The international community should draw lessons from history and should either halt the current drift toward space weaponization or, at the very least, slow its trend. Space-faring powers should recognize the dual-use applications of space technology and make the universal and peaceful use of space their first priority.
The international community has had prior success in preventing certain technologies that have the potential for the destruction of mankind from serving military purposes. The laws of war in the long history of international relations are the crystallization of such efforts. The signing and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which banned an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, has fundamentally standardized the act of war. Of course, such efforts were only undertaken after countless casualties to soldiers and civilians.
On the other hand, it takes far greater effort to prohibit certain technologies from being applied to military purposes after a period without controls than at an early stage when such capabilities are monopolized by a minority of countries. It is far more difficult to set restrictions over the development and use of such technologies once they begin to proliferate. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty took effect 30 years after the first use of nuclear weapons and its effectiveness has been severely weakened as a result.
If efforts to standardize nuclear proliferation had been made in the 1940s and 1950s, and if the international community had made consistent efforts to adhere to strict regulations, the nonproliferation situation today would be significantly different. Confronted with maturing space technologies, mankind must be both brave and wise enough to nip in the bud the natural tendency towards developing increasingly destructive weapons. This is all the more necessary, and difficult, in a closely integrated world where many different countries with their own goals, values and interests must work closely together to deal with new technologies that easily move across borders.
The broad application of modern technology to military affairs is bringing profound and comprehensive changes to the nature of warfare and the level of its destructiveness. Thus, any country¡¯s pursuit of outer space weaponry will inevitably draw negative attention and reaction from other countries. Space weaponization is a double-edged sword. Some big powers may gain advantages in outer space at a certain time but will not be able to monopolize it forever. Therefore, concerned countries will need to sit down and develop rules to standardize space conduct. Although actions that come late are better than never, the price of delay is often too high, a lesson the international community has already learned through international arms control and disarmament. Establishing effective rules of the road to prevent or delay space weaponization is the right and necessary choice.
Following the Cold War, it has been a principal national policy of most countries in the world is to use their limited social resources and wealth to raise standards of living of their citizens and increase comprehensive national strength. How to best use these limited resources and wealth is a crucial question facing every nation in the world. This is especially true following the end of the U.S.-Soviet standoff, when imminent large-scale conflict appears increasingly unlikely. Developing a stable economy has become a near universal priority of every nation. China is a great success story in this regard. Since the mid-1980s, China has shifted from a posture of war readiness to focusing on peaceful development, with remarkable achievements to show for it. A key reason for this success is China¡¯s sensible distribution and use of its domestic resources.
In the foreseeable future, China will concentrate on the development of space technology for civilian use as a driver for economic development. Meanwhile, China will undeniably pay close attention to the progress in space by other nations, particularly the United States, but China will by no means emulate the United States and develop a space weapons program. China has not formulated such policies and does not have sufficient resources to compete with the United States in outer space. Conversely, China is more than willing to cooperate with space powers such as the United States, Russia and the European Union in establishing rules to prevent the weaponization and preserve the tranquility of outer space in the 21st Century.
Endnotes
1. This section consists of updated excerpts from: ¡°White Paper: China¡¯s Space Activities¡±, The Information Office of the State Council of the People¡¯s Republic of China, November, 2000.
2. Huang Guozhu, Jia Yong, Cao Zhi, ¡°Voyage in Peaceful Time: Deng Xiaoping and the China¡¯s Way of Streamlining and Strengthening the PLA¡±, Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 16, 2004. |
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| More than 240 experts and 300 students from 18 countries met in Beijing from 23 to 27 July 2006 for the 8th ILEWG Conference on Exploration and Utilization of the Moon. Based on the deliberations and opinions, the participants have prepared the Lunar Beijing Declaration. |
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| 36th COSPAR Scientific Assembly was held 16 - 23 July 2006 at Beijing, China. |
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