Development Goals of China’s Space Program

Wu Chunsi

The successful Shenzhou VI manned space mission has demonstrated the substantial progress of China’s space technology, and has inspired a patriotic fervor among the Chinese people and their leaders that bodes well for future support of the program. In October of 2005, unprecedented coverage and discussion of the Shenzhou VI launch and China’s space program dominated the country’s Internet chat rooms, newspapers and television programs. Less noticed, however, was the fact that the launch of Shenzhou VI, like its predecessor, Shenzhou V, was scheduled to coincide with the end of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Plenum -- the meeting that introduced the ‘Five Year Plan’ blueprints for China’s economic and social development. All members of the Political Bureau of the CPC publicly lauded the completed manned mission.

The international community has also viewed the Shenzhou VI mission and the progress of China’s space program in a positive light. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on Oct. 17, 2005, hailed the success of the mission declaring the flight a demonstration of how the exploration of space knows no national borders and that every peaceful mission accomplished is another step forward for all humankind. Among some observers, however, there has been conjecture about the possible military application of China’s space program, including progress in missile defense system countermeasures development, as well as in reconnaissance and surveillance. Suspicions regarding the military background and intentions of China’s space program have also been raised. While these arguments appear reasonable to a degree, they do not stand up to closer analysis. A balanced judgment of the Chinese space program’s goals and intentions requires a broader understanding of China’s national strategy and the role of space technology in national development.

Development: Science and Technology

China’s present national strategy was formulated in the late 1970s, at the end of the Cultural Revolution when the country’s economy was on the brink of collapse. With the introduction of ‘reform and opening up’ policies, China placed the highest priority on social and economic development and the improvement of people’s living conditions. After more than two decades of recovery and reconstruction, Chinese citizens, especially urban dwellers, are beginning to enjoy a stable life without worry about food and clothing. Economic development remains the chief goal of China’s national strategy, as stability in China can only be fundamentally guaranteed with sustained and rapid growth. Therefore, China’s domestic policies take precedence over external challenges, and as an integral part of its national strategy, China’s space program must act as a driving force for economic development.

Through the lessons of history, the Chinese people understand that advancement in science and high technology are crucial to economic development and social prosperity. Failure to take advantage of the rise of modern science and technology that evolved in the wake of the Industrial Revolution contributed to China’s perceived humiliation during the 19th and 20th Centuries. The late Deng Xiaoping viewed science and technology as the chief ‘productive force’ for growth and development, a belief that has taken root in the hearts of Chinese people and their leaders. In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent that science and technology will reduce the potential risks and obstructions to achieving sustained economic growth. Hu Jintao has also fully endorsed scientific development by promoting independent initiatives in various sectors of the economy to seek and develop new and advanced technologies.

Space inspires nations to pursue goals of advanced science and technology when they long to achieve prosperity and glory. The strongest countries in the world all possess, or are pursuing, advanced space programs and space technologies. As the only post-Cold War superpower, the United States has achieved a high level of development in space technologies. Russia, also a space power, has seen its capabilities in space as instrumental in maintaining the country’s status as a world power. The European Union and Japan are also driving forward with their space programs. In addition, India and Brazil, two large developing countries, are active in space so as not to fall behind. Space is regarded as both a reflection of a country’s technological prowess and as tied directly to economic development.

Similarly, China’s space program primarily serves its national development strategy. Those who dwell on the military component of China’s space program underestimate its greater strategic meaning. Military and security considerations are certainly important to any country, but they are not the first priority in the current Chinese grand strategy.

Going Commercial

China’s space programs began in an unfavorable security environment. At that time, mainland China was isolated by the international community and faced military threats from both the United States and the former Soviet Union. Under those circumstances, as a country with very limited resources, China had no option but to entrust the mission of developing space-related technologies to the military. Thus, it is historical tradition, to some degree, that has brought about the influence of the military in China’s space program. Approximately 20 years ago, however, a reform program was put forward that called for transforming military sectors to promote economic development. This initiative had, and will continue to produce, a deep impact on the structure of China’s space program.

Space was one of the ‘unlucky’ sectors to be selected for this reform program, as its annual budget from the government was drastically reduced.1 The space industry was required to operate as an enterprise and survive in commercial markets. From this point, China’s space industry gradually matured. It explored domestic and foreign markets, looking for foreign customers and investment, and consequently became familiar with international customs, regulations and import/export procedures. After two decades, many Chinese players in the space industry have become market-oriented enterprises, a phenomenon that will continue and expand in the future. This process has served to separate the civilian and commercial sectors of China’s space program from the military sector, although that division has not yet been completed.

The military presence remaining in some civilian and commercial space activities does not necessarily signify that China has the intention of pursuing military capabilities in space through its civilian space programs. Chinese technicians for the Shenzhou VI project have pointed out that all the technologies utilized for the program are necessary for sending astronauts into space. They are all basic technologies for the peaceful exploration of space and not technology for military development. A number of the capabilities exhibited by China’s manned missions are suspected by some in the Western media to have military applications, such as those related to rocket stability, reliability and accuracy. However, these capabilities were developed and mastered by the United States and the Soviet Union decades ago. Furthermore, the liquid-fueled launch vehicle with strap-on boosters that China uses for Shenzhou missions is nearly obsolete in terms of real military value. Modern militaries depend on high-speed and mobile missiles with solid-fuel propulsion systems.2 A large portion of the civilian space program, in terms of the technologic sophistication, thus is not useful in modern military terms.

Furthermore, civilian and commercial uses of space facilities and technologies enjoy a broad market in China, rather than catering exclusively to the military. A simple illustration is the vigorous application of space technology to China’s booming domestic automobile market. The in-car Global Positioning System (GPS) is an increasingly popular feature in developed countries; the availability of this technology in China remains low but is growing. In 2002, there were more than 20 million vehicles running on China’s motorways. This rise in automobiles has unfortunately led to an increase in auto theft. GPS applications are useful not only in providing services such as navigation and road mapping and traffic management, but also in preventing theft.

With the continuous growth of China’s economy and the improvement in standards of living, it is forecasted that there will be increasing demand for space-related technologies by Chinese society. Thus, in the context of China’s development strategy, more attention should be given to commercial and civilian space programs by Chinese society.

Engagement

The motivation of economic development and the increasing demands of domestic consumption suggest that the peaceful and commercial use of outer space is in accord with China’s interests. This lays a foundation for cooperation between China, the United States and the larger international community. For example, U.S. space activities can be classified into four categories: civil, commercial, defense and intelligence.3 This suggests that despite the dual-use characteristics of space technology, it is still likely, to some degree, for the United States to keep certain space activities in civilian and commercial areas and it is these projects that China potentially can join.

Encouraging China’s integration with the international community will further separate the space industry and the military. By participating in the global economy, the commercial and civilian elements of China’s space program will see their capabilities grow along with a sense of independence from the military. Interactions with foreign players also provide impetus for the civilian and commercial entities to behave in accordance with international norms and regulations, institutional arrangements and management practices. If China follows a path of isolation, exclusion will only deepen its suspicion and resentment, and the commercial and civilian sectors of China’s space program would be forced to seek help from the government or even the military. In addition, the world will lose a vital channel into China’s space market. Therefore, it is in the world’s best interests that China’s space industry be involved with international activities.

Involvement with the international community also shapes China’s policies. A prime example is China’s growing participation in the international regimes of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 9, 1992, China has gradually changed its attitude and policy toward nonproliferation.4 China not only actively participates in a number of international nonproliferation arrangements, but is gradually tightening its domestic legislative regulations and export control systems to this effect. China’s track record in the area of nonproliferation indicates that international engagement can positively influence its behavior. As a newcomer, China needs time and international assistance to further improve the structure of its space industry, so the international community will cooperate with, rather than be suspicious of, its space program.

The presumed military intention of China’s space programs using the connection between the military and civilian institutions is a premature judgment based on appearance. As suggested by the early history of China’s space program, the strong presence of military persons in a civilian institution is, to a large degree, the result of the specific environment in which the initial program was developed. It is narrow-minded to seize upon the flaws of a neophyte in space development. A more constructive method will be aiding China in further regulating and commercializing its space industry.

China’s Space Program a Military Threat?

In comparing space capabilities, it is hard for the Chinese to understand why their comparatively smaller scale space program will pose a military threat to the United States. The technological gap between the United States and China in terms of missiles, satellites, command and control systems, or the ability to integrate these capabilities for military purposes, is at least several decades. Thus, the Chinese tend to believe that such scrutiny cannot be explained by China’s space program itself. Rather, political and even ideological factors must be playing a significant role.

China is considered by some Americans as the largest geo-political threat to U.S. global dominance after the fall of the Soviet Union. Guided by a zero-sum strategic mentality, China-threat proponents are fearful of a Chinese space program emerging as a new driving force for the expansion of China’s capabilities and political influence. Many Chinese perceive this as the real reason behind U.S. concern over China’s space program.

During the flight of Shenzhou VI, there was Western discussion about the possible dual-use applications of Chinese manned space flight. Specifically, skeptics of China’s peaceful development of space technologies worry about surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and other functions that can be applied to military purposes.

It is surprising to this author that the surveillance and other functions were emphasized in the discussion of the Shenzhou VI. This reveals a fundamental lack of knowledge pertaining to China’s satellite capability and, more generally, China’s status as a space-faring nation. China has successfully launched multiple satellites, providing the country with communications, weather data, resource surveying capabilities, geo-positioning and other functions. With these and future planned satellite launches, it is illogical to assume that China would spend its limited resources on a space program that would mirror the purported military functions that satellites can already achieve.

Moreover, if the two-astronaut, five-day manned space flight of Shenzhou VI and China’s dozens of satellites impose a so-called military threat, then how would one judge the military implications of the International Space Station? It is permanently in orbit, and receives frequent visits by U.S. shuttles. There are also vastly more U.S. satellites in orbit. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the United States has approximately 60 dedicated military satellites in operation, which include ocean reconnaissance, weather forecasting and ground imaging satellites in Low Earth orbit (LEO), 29 GPS satellite in Medium Earth orbit (MEO), and communications, early-warning and signals-intelligence satellites in Geosynchronous orbit (GEO). Paralleling the large scale of its space activities, the United States also dominates military spending in space accounting for more than 90 percent of total expenditures by some measures.5

Regarding the application of U.S. military space assets, during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, hundreds of GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions were used, with an additional 5,000 employed in Afghanistan from 2001-02. A comparable number were utilized in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.6 In comparison to U.S. actions, other countries involved in military operations during the same decade did not demonstrate such space capabilities; including in conflicts involving the European Union and NATO in Yugoslavia and Russia in Chechnya. The United States is the only nation that possesses the means to exploit space-based assets for military force on the battle field. The maintenance of this status quo is the main aim of U.S. policy.

Anti-Missile-Defense

There have been concerns in the United States that certain technologies exhibited in the spaceflights of Shenzhou series, such as orbital maneuvers, indicate that China has developed technology to counter U.S. missile defenses.7 The argument connects China’s manned space program with military applications and could potentially antagonize other countries, especially the United States.

It is true that China is deeply concerned about the development and deployment of a U.S. missile defense system for several reasons. Primarily, China considers the willingness of the United States to invest so heavily on such a technologically immature program as suspicious. Furthermore, the unilateral pursuit of missile defense by the administration of President George W. Bush without consideration of the potential impacts on other countries may endanger China’s interests in international stability and regional security. Nonetheless, China does not require a manned space program to strengthen its anti-missile-defense capabilities.

There are many measures that can reduce the effectiveness of U.S. missile defenses, including equipping ballistic missiles with decoys and countermeasures. According to experts studying countermeasures, any country capable of deploying a long-range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned U.S. missile defense.8 On April 24, 1970, China successfully demonstrated to the world its long-range missile capability by launching its first man-made satellite, the Dongfanghong-1. In addition, orbital maneuvering capabilities, which were mentioned in certain media outlets as proof of the connection between China’s space program and anti-missile-defense (AMD) capability, are not new to China. Chinese space experts have claimed it is a technology that was routinely applied in the nation’s recoverable satellite program. Therefore, to stress the AMD function of China’s manned space program is, at the very least, misleading.

After several years of observation, study and debate, Chinese officials, scientists and researchers have reached a clearer and more realistic understanding of U.S. missile defense. While the strategic intentions and the potential of the program is still a matter of concern, it is also generally acknowledged in China that U.S. missile defense will not be technically mature or practically effective in the near future. Accordingly, it is illogical for China to give AMD a central role in its space program. The AMD argument in relation to China’s space program overestimates the importance of the U.S. missile defense system to China’s strategic planning. The fundamental importance of China’s space program stems from its potential contributions to the country’s national development strategy and not for military application.

Conclusions

China’s White Paper on China’s space activities, published in November 2000, clearly states that the government has always regarded the space industry as an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy.9 It further stresses that the exploration and utilization of outer space should be for peaceful purposes and the collective benefit of all mankind. As a developing country, China’s fundamental tasks are to develop its economy and continuously press forward with its modernization drive. The peaceful use of outer space can best serve these national goals and, therefore, is in line with China’s interests.

In June of 2002, China, together with the Russia Federation, submitted to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva a working paper entitled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Objects” (CD/1VI79).10 The document requires countries “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” The document further states countries shall not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects.” However, the draft’s sponsors recognize that some space assets have an implicit military use and that it would seem impossible for the U.S. to give up its missile defense under development. Therefore, the document does allow for certain space military activities, stating that it “shall not be construed as impeding the research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes or other military uses not prohibited by this Agreement.”

These policy and legislative documents clearly indicate the Chinese government’s recognition that its security interests lie in preventing the weaponization of space and taking precautions against the negative affects of military operations on commercial and civilian activities in space. China does not have the luxury of engaging in a military competition with superpowers in space, or in other areas. Instead, exploring and developing space with other countries, sharing its economic potential and reducing conflict are unequivocally in China’s interest.

In fact, the economic and commercial activities of people around the world are growing increasingly dependent on space. If the peace in space were disrupted by military operations or strategic competition, everyone would lose. For the same reason, both the Untied States and China must be concerned about the development of so-called anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Although the number, and the applied scope, of Chinese satellites is not as large as that of the United States, China utilizes its satellites to great advantage. The use of ASAT weapons could destroy China’s satellites and greatly harm China’s economic activities that depend on this technology.

Therefore, an urgent task for all countries currently employing space-based technologies is to establish a system of rules to manage and coordinate space activities. There are some existing laws and regulations, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Astronaut Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention, the 1976 Registration Convention and the 1984 Moon Agreement, but they are insufficient in a time when advanced technological proliferation is proceeding rapidly. We now stand at the threshold of space weaponization. The number of nations active in space is increasing, and thus the international community must act quickly while the present window of opportunity remains open to formulate regulations to guide activities while promoting international space cooperation.

It is true that space technologies can be applied to both civilian and military areas, yet China’s space policy shows that it desires to cooperate with the international community to exploit economic and civilian benefits to the fullest extent possible. This must be pursued while simultaneously restricting the applications of space technologies for warfare to the bare minimum.

Endnotes
1. For the early history of the China program on transferring military sectors to serve for economic development, see: Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze, Malabar, Florida, Krieger Publishing Company, 1998, pp. 54-55.
2. “Shenzhou-VI Has No Military Threat,” Global Times (in Chinese), Oct. 24, 2005, p.1.
3. See the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 10VI-VI5, Jan. 11, 2001.
4. For a history review of the development of China’s nonproliferation policy, see: Zhu Mingquan, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1997, pp. 40-48.
5. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. 42-59, p.5. Recently, the Union of Concerned Scientists published a satellite database, which lists the details of the satellites different countries have. The website of the database is: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/satellite_database.html.
6. Ibid., p.3.
7. The argument was noted in “Shenzhou-VI Has No Military Threat,” Global Times (in Chinese), Oct. 24, 2005, p.1. Also see, Joseph Kahn, “Reaching for Moon, China Works to Put Astronauts in Orbit,” The New York Times, March 14, 2003, p. 1.
8. “Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System,” Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000.
9. The Information Office of the State Council of P.R. China: “White Paper: China’s Space Activities,” November 2000.
10. See: http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/pdf/1679.pdf.