Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy*

Sun Xiangli

(Sun Xiangli is the Deputy Director of the Arms Control Research Division, Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. Her work focuses on the studies of verification for nuclear disarmament, China's nuclear strategy, the U.S. nuclear policies, non-proliferation regime.)

In recent years, a number of Western scholars have conducted research regarding China's nuclear strategy, concluding for instance that before the 1980s China did not have a strategic guideline for its nuclear weapons program and the evolution of its nuclear weapons was mainly driven by technological factors. It could be perceived that, to a certain degree, China's limited technical and economic resources determined its minimum deterrence policy. Other scholars have noted that some articles of the Chinese Army from the 1980s showed that China's military strategy scientists advocated China's development from a "minimum nuclear deterrence" to a "limited nuclear deterrence," which would give China the limited capability of attacking military targets, thus concluding that China could change the nature of its nuclear strategy when economic and political conditions permitted. This writer believes such judgments are one-sided and, to a great extent, misperceived. This writer also hopes that scholars will continue with their research and exchange of views in order to change their one-sided view so that they can correctly understand China's nuclear strategy and promote mutual trust in the strategic field among the nuclear powers.

This article discusses the basis on which Chinese leaders make political and strategic decisions about China's nuclear strategy, presents an analysis of the main characteristics and nature of China's nuclear strategy, and finally provides the writer's opinions on issues such as the development of China's nuclear strategy.

China's Nuclear Strategic Decision-Making
The top decision-making group, headed by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, framed China's nuclear policy. The Chinese leaders who worked out the nation's nuclear strategy had a very clear and realistic understanding of the nature and role of nuclear weapons. China's own strategic thinking was formed on the basis of such an understanding, which has served as a guideline for the whole development process of China's strategic nuclear force.

Chairman Mao Zedong once said that nuclear weapons were "paper tigers". As he later explained, this statement was meant to inspire the Chinese people's morale and he did not mean that nuclear weapons were really merely paper tigers. His statement was mainly to emphasize the fact that wars could not be won only with one or two advanced weapons. Mao Zedong had a clear understanding of nuclear weapons' effects. He said in 1970 that "though there still exists the possibility for major powers to fight world wars, the atomic bombs have prevented them from doing so." This shows that Mao understood the principle of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, he also noticed political and moral problems in using nuclear weapons. "Our country may produce a small number of atom bombs in the future. But we are not going to use them…. We keep them only as defensive weapons," he said. "How can atom bombs be used without limit? We wouldn't use them without limit even if we had them, for to do so would be a crime" Again this illustrates that Mao Zedong clearly understood both nuclear weapons' effects and limitations.

The Chinese decision-making group had clear-cut principles for nuclear force development in terms of quantity. Several leaders remarked time after time, "We need atom bombs and hydrogen bombs. But we only need a limited amount." It is no use to have many of them." Of course, these weapons must have a deterrent effect, and a certain number and survival of the nuclear weapons must be guaranteed. Premier Zhou Enlai once said regarding nuclear weapons that "the key does not lie with their quantity, rather, we need to have a minimum amount, quality and variety". In short, the key to having a credible nuclear deterrence is to guarantee an effective nuclear retaliatory capability. Just as Gen. Nie Rongzhen said, we "must have minimal retaliatory strike capability."

The scientists who directly participated in the development of nuclear weapons have confirmed these basic principles above. This writer has often heard from senior scientists and leaders who have taken part in nuclear weapon development who agree that China's nuclear weapons are mainly political and strategic deterrent weapons.

Thus, decision-making leaders' and scientists' understanding of nuclear weapons is that they should only have a strategic deterrent effect rather than being used in battlefields as conventional weapons. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is determined not by the comparative quantity and war-fighting capability of the weapons, but rather by their capability for retaliation.

Based on these principles, and according to its economic, technical and geographic conditions, China has developed a limited nuclear force. The main requirement for the nuclear force is to ensure the effectiveness of deterrence under any circumstances: that is, to survive the enemy's first strike by maintaining a basic retaliatory capability. Therefore, throughout the development of China's nuclear force, great emphasis has been placed on survivability and reliability. Since the 1970s and 1980s, other countries have rapidly improved their precision strike capabilities and have made great progress with their missile defense systems. Correspondingly, China's nuclear force has also gradually modernized from the first generation using liquid fuel and fixed silos to the second generation using solid fuel and mobile launching pads with better penetrability. But its purpose remains to insure an effective nuclear deterrence in the new strategic environment.

For national security reasons, official documents elaborating on China's nuclear strategic theory have not been released to the public in the past decades. But the fact remains that China has maintained a consistent framework of nuclear policy that is based on a clear understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons. Since the 1980s, China's economic and technical conditions have been greatly improved and, as a result, have allowed China to expand its nuclear arsenal. Yet, even with these improved conditions, China still holds to its policy of a limited nuclear arsenal, which underscores the fact that nuclear strategic principles have guided China's nuclear force development.

Characteristics Of China's Nuclear Strategy
1. Strategies of Major Nuclear Weapons States

According to some Western analyses, the strategies of the five nuclear weapon states can be roughly divided into two categories. The first includes the United States and Russia (Soviet) and entails a nuclear strategy with both first-strike and war-fighting capabilities. The other category includes China, Britain and France, which is essentially one of "minimum deterrence". States with this kind of strategy maintain only second-strike (nuclear retaliation) capabilities and do not pursue war-fighting capabilities.

Yet, China's nuclear strategy is still quite different from those of Britain and France, especially in terms of the deterred targets and the number of weapons needed for retaliation after suffering a first strike. China has a No-First-Use (NFU) policy, which means that its nuclear weapons are used only for deterring nuclear attacks (while British and French nuclear weapons may also be used for deterring conventional offensives). As for the number of weapons needed to retain second-strike capability, China maintains a very limited nuclear arsenal, for China's understanding of "unacceptable damage from a nuclear attack" is different from that of the Western countries. It seems inappropriate to define China's nuclear strategy with the term "minimum deterrence" consistently used by Western countries because it would then be impossible to differentiate between China's nuclear strategy and those of the British and French. Thus, China's nuclear strategy is, more precisely, a "defensive nuclear deterrence characterized by the policy of NFU".

2. Characteristics of China's Nuclear Strategy

There are essentially three unique aspects of China's nuclear strategy:

i. The policy of NFU. Generally speaking, there are two instances in which a state is the first to use nuclear weapons: one is a first-strike or preemptive nuclear strike, aimed at eliminating the enemy's potential strategic nuclear force; the other is using nuclear weapons (as the last resort) in times of crisis during conventional conflicts.
China's policy of NFU - made public in 1964 - is unconditional. Tha
t is to say, China will not be the first one to use nuclear weapons in either of the above circumstances. Considering China's foreign policy and security environment at that time, such a position had credibility and was a positive influence internationally.

First, this policy was based on the Chinese leaders' understanding of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. In the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a feverish nuclear arms race alongside an international movement against nuclear arms of almost equal intensity. At such a time, China's declaration of NFU clearly revealed the nature of its nuclear strategy as defensive and reflected the Chinese government's political stand against nuclear wars. These policies also had resonance with the international will against nuclear wars and thus had real political significance.

Secondly, the policy of NFU shows China's confidence in conventional battles and in obtaining strategic deterrence through its nuclear retaliation capability. In the 1950s and 1960s, China had countermeasures against conventional threats. With strategic depth and experience in extended combat, China was not afraid of waging conventional battles against intruders, even those with superior conventional power. Therefore, the main purpose of China's nuclear weapons at that time was to counter nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail. It was unnecessary for China to be the first to use nuclear weapons to deter an enemy's conventional offensive. Moreover, China did not need war-fighting and first-strike capabilities to deter a nuclear attack. A minimum nuclear deterrent was sufficient.

So, we may say that China's policy of NFU was made in those years on the basis of credible political and strategic decision-making.

In recent years, some scholars have suggested that China should give up its NFU policy as China's capacity to protect, for instance, highly developed coastal economic zones from conventional offensives is growing increasingly difficult. However, currently, there is no indication the Chinese government has any intention of changing this policy. There are two reasons for this: 1) the possibility of a large scale conventional offensive against China by any country is almost zero; and 2) China's capability in resisting conventional offensives has been greatly improved in recent years with the introduction of advanced and new technologies for its conventional forces.

There is also the issue of deterring biological and chemical weapons (BCW) with nuclear weapons. As BCW cannot be compared with nuclear weapons in terms of the level of threat and destructive effects, it remains unlikely nuclear weapons will be used to deter the use of BCW. Furthermore, using nuclear weapons to fight against BCW of a non-nuclear weapons state violates the negative security assurances made by the nuclear weapons states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which China has adhered for many years. Accordingly, this author believes that the Chinese government will not give up its commitment to NFU even under threat from BCW.

ii. Retaining a limited nuclear force. Since the 1960s, China has maintained a very small nuclear force and a restrained posture.

There are different theories about the amount of nuclear weapons required for a second strike capability. In the 1960s, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara set a criterion for assured destruction. He thought that "unacceptable damage" for the Soviet Union would be to wipe out 20-25 percent of its population and destroy 50-75 percent of its industries; requiring approximately 400 nuclear warheads.

China has always believed that the threshold of "unacceptable damage" can be accomplished using only a very small amount of nuclear weapons, and whose criterion in this regard seems to be lower than in the West. The Chinese call it a "minimum retaliating strike".

Of course, this does not mean the number of weapons that make up a limited nuclear force is immutably fixed. In fact, the required size for such a capability is a dynamic quantity relating to the nuclear arsenal's survivability. For instance, one guide to the size required of China's nuclear force is to be able to mount a nuclear strike that can penetrate an enemy's missile defense system after surviving a first strike.

iii. China has always supported full-scale and complete nuclear disarmament. The Chinese government's stand is clear: China will disarm its nuclear force so long as the other nuclear weapons states completely give up nuclear arms. But before a comprehensive nuclear disarmament, China will continue to maintain a very limited but effective nuclear deterrence while continuing its effort to maintain stable strategic relations among nuclear weapon states.

China's Nuclear Strategic Trends
Today, some people at home and abroad are studying and surmising China's strategic nuclear trends. Some predict that with an evolving strategic environment, China's nuclear weapon modernization will lead to a significant expansion of its nuclear force as well as substantive changes to its nuclear strategy.

A thesis published in the journal International Security in 1995 stated that since 1987, a large number of articles have appeared in China supporting the development of a "limited nuclear deterrence" with limited war-fighting capability. In fact, the sources cited in this thesis represent only the opinions of individuals in China rather than that of the Chinese government.

This author holds that it is unlikely for the Chinese government to give up its current defensive nuclear deterrent policy in the foreseeable future for the following reasons. First of all, there will be no material changes in the nuclear strategic principles, which are based on a consistent understanding of the nature and role of nuclear weapons. Despite today's continuing evolution of new and advanced military technologies, the fundamentals of nuclear weapons have not changed. And so, China's guidelines for its nuclear strategy have not changed. In fact, the nuclear arms race during the Cold War proved that the nuclear war-fighting strategy does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Rather, it leads to strategic instability and to the danger of nuclear wars among nuclear weapon states. In addition, such a strategy will theoretically require a large quantity and variety of nuclear weapons, which will consume substantial economic and technological resources. Obviously, this is not in conformity with China's long-term general strategy of economic development. Also, China's current security environment is much better than that of the 1950s and 1960s. Relations between China and major nuclear weapon states have markedly improved and, accordingly, it is unnecessary for China to modify its nuclear strategy. In addition, the international mechanism of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons requires nuclear weapon states to constantly minimize the significance of nuclear weapons. As the Chinese government is actively supporting such non-proliferation mechanisms it should not alter its defensive nuclear posture.

The current policy and position of the Chinese government has also not shown that there will be material changes in China's nuclear strategy in the near future. For instance, "China's National Defense" white papers released in 2002 and 2004 expressly reiterates China's persistent adherence to a defensive nuclear posture and its opposition to an arms race.

In summary, this author holds that China's nuclear strategy is guided by the following three principles: 1) NFU; 2) maintaining a limited nuclear force and 3)supporting complete global nuclear disarmament. These basic tenets are based on the sober understanding of nuclear weapons' unique characteristics and roles, which remain unchanged. Despite substantial threat to its national security, including nuclear threats and blackmail, China has maintained these guiding principles, thus proving its resolve to keep its nuclear policy unchanged. Of course, China will also continue with its nuclear weapons modernization, but its main purpose will continue to be to improve the general survivability of its nuclear weapon force so as to ensure the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence into the future.

* With permission of the author, this article was adapted from an earlier Chinese publication of it in "2005 Reports of International Arms Control and Disarmament", ed. by China Arms Control And Disarmament Association, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, 2005.